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The western Agent theory suggests that there are two principal agent conflict in the modern enterprises, first, the conflict between shareholders and creditors, and second, the conflict between shareholders and managers. Debt financing is an important mode of enterprises financing, it’s influence on corporate investment behavior has two sides, on one hand, debt financing can alleviate the over-investment behavior triggered by the conflict between shareholders and managers, on the other hand, debt financing will increase the conflict between shareholders and creditors, which generating asset substitution and under-investment phenomenon. In the listed companies of China, if the debt financing have obvious influence on the corporate investment behavior, and how the debt financing play its role in the companies with different growth opportunities, these issues have very important research value and significance, and also triggered a wide range of theatrical thought and empirical testing.This essay based on the Agent theory and reviewed relevant literature, then selected the study data from the listed company in China for six years, from 2001 to 2006, to make an empirical analysis, in order to find whether the levels, maturity structure and source structure of debt financing have an impact on the corporate investment spending. The empirical test showed that in the overall sample, there is a negative correlation relationship between the level of debt financing and corporate investment spending. After that, all enterprises were distinguished into two groups by their growth opportunities for empirical testing individually, then found that debt financing have different mechanism in the two groups, in the high-growth group, it has played an restraining role on the corporate investment spending, while in the low-growth group, it has played a disciplinary role. Meanwhile, compared to the long-term debt and bank loans, the influence from short-term debt and commercial credit were more pronounced.
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