Dissertation > Excellent graduate degree dissertation topics show

Research on Contracting for Service Co-Production

Author: LiHuiFen
Tutor: YangDeLi
School: Dalian University of Technology
Course: Management Science and Engineering
Keywords: Services Co-production Contract Model Residual Rights Allocation Game Equilibrium Knowledge Stickiness
CLC: F719
Type: PhD thesis
Year: 2013
Downloads: 38
Quote: 0
Read: Download Dissertation

Abstract


In recent years, knowledge-based morden service business has been developed rapidly both in the developed countries, such as the United States, and the developing countries such as China and India. But the modern service industry is not easy to achieve high efficiency. Knowledge-based service business system is a system of value co-creation and joint production process because that client enterprise is not limited to the purchase and consumption of service, but also the service provider’s business partner. Therefore, the client’s cooperation is a key consideration in service design, and the collaborative relationship has great influences on service quality and service performance. Therefore, it has important theoretical and practical significance to discuss the contract problem of co-production between service provider and client enterprise.In this paper, with a service provider and a client enterprise as the representatives, we focus on contractual selection problems in different service co-production relations with the game theory as the main analysis tools and using information economics and industry economics. We will find that the contractual selection mechanism is influenced both by the relative importance, the knowledge stickiness in knowledge transferring processes, and the cooperation degree between the two sides. Through establishing game models of the different co-production relationships, the paper can provide decision-making assistance for the service practices. The main research contents are as follows:(1) The essence and mechanism of client participation in production of service.Through reviewing the related literature, the meaning of the client participating in service co-production is explained, the essence of knowledge transferring and the influence of knowledge stickiness during service co-production processes is stated, and the research status of service contract is analyzed after reviewing the contract related theories. Base on these, we propose our study problem, set up our study object, and select our study perspective and method. On the other hand, the conceptual and theoretical basises for the study models are established.(2) The classification and characteristics of the different service co-production relationships.By reviewing the meaning of business to business cooperation relationships and analyzing the essence of knowledge transferring between the sides, the two classification dementions on service co-production relations are proposed and the three types of basic co-production relations are presented, including the consulting relation controlled mainly by the client organization, the saling relation controlled mainly by the provider, and the alliance relation jointly controlled by the two sides. Then, the collaborative degree characteristics, the knowledge transferring characteristics, and the organization controlling characteristics are analyzed in the three types of service co-production relations seperativly to construct concept basises for the study models.(3) The Nash non-cooperation game residual rights allocation model.To select the contract of service co-production, the residual rights allocation problem is reguired to solve firstly. In consideration of the unilateral rational case and given collaborative degree, the concept of knowledge stickiness is introduced to the Nash non-cooperation game residual rights allocation model of service co-production according to the knowledge transferring characteristics of service co-production between the provider and the client. It is finded that under gven collaborative degree conditions, both the relative importance and the relative knowledge stickiness together influence the optimal residual rights allocation. Then, by changing the co-production degree in Xue-Field’s service co-production pricing model, it is concluded that, except for the relative importance and the relative knowledge stickiness, the co-production degree of the parties involved can also affect the service pricing.(4) The Nash cooperation game residual rights allocation model.In the team rational case, given co-production degree firstly, the concept of knowledge stickiness is introduced to the Nash cooperation game residual rights allocation model of service co-production according to the knowledge transferring characteristics of service co-production between the provider and the client. It is finded that under gven co-production degree conditions, both the relative importance and the relative knowledge stickiness together influence the optimal residual rights allocation. Then, by changing the co-production degree in the Nash cooperative game residual rights allocation model, it is concluded that the co-production degree, the relative importance, and the relative knowledge stickiness of the participants jointly affect the optimal residual rights allocation.(5) The contractual payment models in different service co-production environment.According to the parameters characteristics of different service co-production environment, the optimal contractual residual rights structure is determined and the relative principle-agent contractual payment models are constrcted to select the optimal transferring payment constrcat for diffirent service co-production relations. In the consulting service co-production relation controlled mainly by the client, it is concleded that the optimal payment pattern is a time and materials (TM) contract contigent on the provider’s cost compensation which is low-powered incentives. Oppositely, in the saling service co-production relation controlled mainly by the provider, it has the conclusion of that the optimal payment pattern is a fixed-fee contract contigent on effort output (FF-O) which is high-powered incentives. As to the alliance service co-production relationship jointly controlled by the two sides and bilateral moral hazard is presented, the optimal payment pattern is proved to be a bilateral performace-based contract (PB) which revenue and risk is shared by the two sides according to their relative important parameters.

Related Dissertations

  1. Based on game theory and reinforcement learning optimal scheduling of the transportation system and its application of,U491
  2. Research on the Risk Management of International EPC Project,F284
  3. Research on Supply-driven Supply Chain Collaboration Contract Model,F274
  4. Research on Bidding Strategy of Rotary Reserve Capacity Market Based on Conjectural Variations,F407.61
  5. Analyses of Approaches and Incentives to Information Resources Sharing,G203
  6. Entrusted to the origin of the concept of patient rights , pursuant to and in,B82-05
  7. Research on Decision of Enterprises’ Advertising Strategy,F713.8
  8. The Relationship between Urban Transport and Residential Location Choice,U491
  9. Financial Globalization Game Analysis of financial regulation legislation,D912.28
  10. Competition, Internal Institutions and External Institutions,F830.91
  11. Research on the Key Technologies of QoS-Allocation Based on Non-cooperative Game Theory Model,TP393.02
  12. Research on the Theory and Technology of Contract Mining,F224
  13. Research on Several Key Technologies of Rational Threshold Signature,TN918.2
  14. Research on Restoration Strategies and Algorithms for Intelligent Optical Network Based on SRLG Constraint,TN929.1
  15. Research on accounting information disclosure of OTC Market,F406.72
  16. A Study on Coordination of Multi-channel Based on Virtual Trading Community,F274
  17. On Equivalent Efficiency Principle Based Supply Chain Coordination,F274
  18. The Research about the Shill Bidding Problem of Online Auction on Internet,F713.359
  19. Study on Evolution of the Land Requisition Compensation Standard within the Frame-work of Property Evolution,F301.2
  20. Research on the Manufacturer’s Strategies of Selling Channel Selection Based on Customers’ Choice,F713.3

CLC: > Economic > Trade and Economic > Domestic Trade and Economic > Services sector
© 2012 www.DissertationTopic.Net  Mobile