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Venture capital is one of the important financing channel for high - tech start-ups , to some extent, to solve the financing problem of high-tech start-ups . Three subjects : investors , venture capitalists ( venture capitalists ) , and high-tech enterprises entrepreneurs involved in the operation of the venture capital process , any stage in the process of venture capital operation contains a dual agency relationship , that is, investors the agency relationship and venture capitalists , venture capitalists and entrepreneurs , the agency relationship . Double principal-agent mechanism , due to the risk of investment in professional and high-tech , uncertainties and other factors , making a very serious information asymmetry , agency costs . This paper based on the theory of information economics to use of the game theory Homostrom-tirole model as a tool , from three aspects : first , the analysis of the first tier of the agency relationship , that venture capitalists only as an agent , investors with adverse selection and moral hazard problems between venture capitalists . The second tier of the agency relationship , that venture capitalists only as a client , adverse selection and moral hazard problems between the venture capitalists and high-tech enterprise entrepreneurs . Third , considering the dual agency relationship , that venture capitalists at the same time act as agent and attorney , and venture capitalists , entrepreneurs and high-tech enterprises Conspiracy . Discussion of these three issues , this paper presents a number of recommendations to solve the problem .
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