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Coal and electricity is an important foundation of our energy , both play an important role in the development of our national economy . Since the 1970s , the country of coal from the original planned price began to shift to the Planning price , while the price of electricity has been controlled by the government . Thus it appears that the reform of the coal and electricity are not synchronized with the dual-track , resulting in both production contradictory produce continuous intensification . To resolve the contradictions above the coal industry in China , in-depth study of the literature , the introduction on the structure of the relationship of the coal industry in China , the first from the electricity market point of view , the introduction of auction parameters hawk-dove game thinking structure more in line with the gain matrix of the power generation side of the electricity market situation in China , the use of evolutionary game theory to evolution analysis of electricity vendors , evolutionary equilibrium Jacobian matrix obtained vendors point to determine a bid to promote the vendors the healthy and stable development of the evolutionary stable strategy . Followed by cooperation from non- coal power angle in tariff conditions known to be associated with the complete information , the oversupply of coal and electricity oversupply both cases , the use of a the reaction function draw conducive coal coal-fired electricity market prices, output and power , and later in bargaining model under incomplete information obtained coal prices, output and power . Coal prices, output and power on then and the interests of society to maximize angle , ks solution of cooperation gains profit distribution , it has concluded , the electricity market price formation process , the size of the enterprise competition probability and priority in obtaining income amount of change have an important impact on the electricity market stability and the formation of bidding are compared to coal-fired electricity cooperative game with non- cooperative game , cooperation of individual interests tend to be more to maximize profit is also greater than the sum of the non - profit cooperative game , does not stop there , both to achieve cooperation can also ease the contradictions brought about by the dual pricing system to break the coal do not sell , do not produce electricity situation .
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