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Equity incentive is a new type of management of the distribution system and the excitation pattern. It agreed to allow the operator to get a certain number of the shares, so that the operator's role from a simple agent to managers and owners to the goals and interests of the owners and operators, which will link. To a certain extent, equity incentive can solve the the business principal-agent problem, enabling operators to be more concerned about the long-term development of enterprises to maximize enterprise value. Equity incentive since its birth in the 1950s, the Western developed countries are widely used in modern corporate governance practice, was a great success in solving the principal-agent problem. In China, the development of incentive stock options is lagging behind in the early 90s of the last century, China's only the first the pilot equity incentive systems of the company - Shenzhen Vanke Group. Meanwhile, our imperfect laws and regulations, and securities markets unique ownership split conditions, a serious impediment to the use of the equity incentive system in China's listed companies. With China's rapid economic development, the original shackles of China's economic development regulations, the system has gradually been abolished, breaking a series of related laws and regulations have been introduced. 2004, the State Council's \April 29, 2005, the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued a notice on listed companies split share structure reform pilot, split share structure reform in China kicked off. January 1, 2006, the newly amended Law \Meanwhile, the China Securities Regulatory Commission has issued a listed company equity incentive management approach \December 6th, 2006, the SASAC issued the \In this context, the paper selected the split share structure reform, the implementation of incentive stock options listed companies as the research object, agent theory, human capital theory, incomplete contract theory and transaction cost theory principles, the company's performance and equity incentive relations empirical analysis, a comprehensive description of the status quo of China's listed companies equity incentive, found the problem, and finally put forward feasible policy recommendations. Chapter 1 Introduction. The first describes the research background and significance of the proposed second purpose of this study and possible contribution Finally, the ideas and methods of the study. The basis of the second chapter of the theory and literature review. Equity incentive theory is based primarily on principal-agent theory, human capital theory, incomplete contract theory, transaction cost theory. The principal-agent theory is the basic theory of the origin of equity incentive, incentive stock options is due primarily to the company executives and shareholders, liability risks resulting from principal-agent problem. Into human capital theory is that in the era of knowledge economy, human capital in economic growth played a key role in the equity incentive It is the affirmation of the human capital theory. Incomplete contract theory is that, due to some degree of bounded rationality or transaction costs, making the reality of the contract is incomplete. Incomplete contract conditions, the agent does not only determined in accordance with the the dominant contract terms agreed remuneration for the extent of their own efforts, the hidden clauses in the contract will become an important motivating factor. The transaction cost theory should not only emphasized the production of enterprises have been ignored in the transaction, that is great importance to the enterprise system structure or property rights arrangements. In order to reduce transaction costs, companies should managers as acquisition targets, incentive, so that the internal management personnel, to become an integral part of. The literature review reviews at home and abroad on company performance and equity incentive Empirical Study literature and a comparative analysis of these documents, their main conclusion of the study have very different samples, the selection of variables and empirical methods select different. Chapter equity incentive effect formation mechanism. First introduced the definitions and types of incentive stock options, this article will the equity incentive Type divided into two categories according to the different the incentive target rights and obligations and incentives subject of mode and specific equity incentive model under each category. Then from the intrinsic and extrinsic conduction mechanism analyzed equity incentive effect formation mechanism. Including on the analysis of the factors, the main 'principal-agent theory, human capital theory analysis option incentive Why can impact the behavior of the operators; the external conduction mechanism is the departure from the point of view of the stock market, analyze price information passed , the impact on the operators as well as the need for the implementation of equity incentive. Chapter split share structure reform of listed companies in China before and after the equity incentive. First, a brief before the share reform of listed companies in China equity incentive, and describes the obstacles encountered in implementation of equity incentive in the current economic context, China's listed companies. Then analyzes the split share structure reform of listed companies in China equity incentive cleared the obstacles and benefits: solve the problem of non-tradable shareholders have long plagued China's capital market development and the interests of the holders of tradable shares fragmented, and solve the equity incentive source stock, contribute to the rational regression of the stock pricing mechanism is conducive to the establishment and improvement of the company's management incentive and restraint mechanisms. Described the current situation after the share reform of listed companies in China equity incentive regional distribution of these companies, industry distribution, holding category and the excitation mode selection made descriptive statistics. Chapter split share structure reform of listed companies in China Performance and Equity Incentive An Empirical Analysis. The core portion of this article. Assumed under the equity incentive effect the formation of internal factors, the hypothesis is presented, listed companies' financial performance and equity incentive stake there was a significant positive correlation between; external conduction mechanism, formulating hypotheses, listed companies financial performance and equity incentive value there was a significant positive correlation. Research design choices implemented from January 1, 2005 to 2008, incentive stock options as a sample, the proportion of equity incentive and equity incentive value as the independent variable, corporate performance as the dependent variable, select the size of the company , capital structure, holding class model as control variables. 3 Empirical results and analysis first sample, equity incentives to implement before and after the two-year performance and model index descriptive statistics, from the maximum, minimum, standard and poor compared and analyzed and summarized. Then test since the variables and the model of the correlation, it is determined whether the variable settings and the design of the model is consistent with the statistical requirements. Finally, the model regression analysis to test hypotheses, regression results. Chapter conclusions and recommendations through empirical research, the main conclusions are: 1. Implementation of equity incentive corporate performance has significantly improved than before the implementation of China's listed companies. Equity incentive value and return on net assets was significantly positively correlated with equity incentives to the operators of the additional compensation is more, the better the business performance. (3) the proportion of equity incentive ROE significantly positively correlated, indicating that the Share Incentive Scheme, the greater the proportion of the company's total share capital to equity granted to employees, the better the performance of the enterprise. Finally, the theoretical foundation and empirical results, starting from the point of view of the management and the company's own, make policy recommendations: to strengthen the construction of the capital market, improve the relevant laws, regulations and policies, the development of scientific equity incentive system, improve corporate governance structure, the establishment of scientific performance evaluation system, building effective market manager. The possible contribution of this paper is mainly reflected in: 1. Equity incentive effect formation mechanism is divided into the internal mechanism and external transmission mechanism is analyzed from the point of view of the stock market to the equity incentive effect formation mechanism, lay a theoretical foundation for the modeling. (2) In the analysis of the level of equity incentives, not only equity incentive equity granted to operators, so that operators have the incentive effects of residual claims brought, also consider the return on equity incentive effects. Model, both set to the explanatory variables, to observe the impact on performance. 3 study commenced in the new context. Select the share reform beginning to the end of 2008, the implementation of incentive stock options as a sample data up-to-date, at the same time, make policy recommendations with a strong timeliness. Deficiencies in this article are: 1. Sample selection. Since this study is based on split share structure reform of listed companies after the implementation of equity incentive, so the sample size is only 31, accounting for the proportion of all the listed companies in China is very small. On the securities market as a whole, convincing. With the conduct of the share reform and the improvement of the relevant laws and regulations, the implementation of equity incentive companies will be more and more, future research can expand the number of samples, increasing empirical results convincing. Corporate performance, including operating performance, organizational performance and financial performance. The first two metrics are difficult to quantify, they have not been in-depth study, to select only the financial performance of the empirical analysis, the empirical model to be further improved. 3 selected in the variable, because of the small sample size, without considering the size of the industry, risk factors, growth, and some external factors, further research is needed in the selection of the control variables.
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