Dissertation > Excellent graduate degree dissertation topics show
Studies on Coordination of Three-echelon Brand Monoplization Supply Chain Based on Option Contract
Author: WangShengLan
Tutor: LiSheng
School: Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
Course: Logistics Management
Keywords: Supply chain of brand monopolization Option contract Buy-back contract Risk Sharing Supply Chain Coordination
CLC: F224
Type: Master's thesis
Year: 2010
Downloads: 63
Quote: 0
Read: Download Dissertation
Abstract
|
Brand is the mark of enterprises and products. It strengthens enterprises’ competitive power by improving the quality of products, fostering a good company image and protecting consumers’benefits. Brand monopolization is an important marketing strategy usually used in Automobile, Clothing industry etc. And the supply chain excuted brand monopolization is called Supply Chain of Brand Monopolization(SCBM).SCBM’s characteristic is that the core of this kind supply chain is brand owner, who has the authority to decide the wholesale price and retail price. Usually the brand owner is the manufacturer. Therefore, Retailer’s only decision is the economic order quantity, which may bring about "Double Marginalization" as other supply chains. One of effective instruments resolving this problem is supply chain coordination mechanism, which can provide information portional share and order stimulus to coordinate the whole supply chain.Option contract is a newly developing coordination mechanism, which can coordinate supply chain and evade unnecessary risk through formulating proper parameters. Futhermore, Option belongs interdisciplinary instrument, so the application in supply chain accords for the scholarly pursuits.This paper analyzes the coordination of SCBM as option is applied, and then analyzes the risk share and profit increasing after the Buy-Back is put into use. The main content and conclusions as followed:The first chapter is introduction. In this chapter, the writer analyzes the background and significance of this paper, then sums up recent studies about inclusive dealing and SCBM, and at last summarizes this paper’s main study methods and innovations.The second chapter provides the concept of supply chain management, and analyzes the patnership of supply chain members. Then analyzes SCBM’s coordination based on theroies. The third chapter establishes the coordination model when the two-echelon SCBM adopts options. This model, considering a manufaturer-retailer supply chain, is analyzed by game theory and supply chain coordiantion theory, and I get a conclusion that profits of this supply chain are promoted and the manufacturer and retailer’s profit are also improved. Moreover, I found that option price is the make-up retailer gives to manufacturer as he provide option contract to share demand risk. Therefore, Manufacturer just need to decide the propotion to enable the coordination of supply chain. This conclusion is validated by an similar example.The fourth chapter assumes manufacturer and retailer league, then the league and supplier adopt buy-back contract. Through discussing buy-back contract’s effect to supply chain profit, we find that only when the parameters {bs,ws} satisfy the optimum order quantity, supply chain will achieve optimality. Comparing with two-echelon SCBM in chapter three, three-echelon SCBM’s total profits and individual profits are improved. At last, this chapter discuss the risk share under the environment of adopting option and buy-back contract.The fifth chapter discusses whether the strategy that manufacturer makes retail price is proper. Therefore, this chapter assumes a SCBM consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers. After comparing with supply chain’s best retail price and retailers’best retail price, I get a conclusion that supply chain’s best retail price can’t maximize retailer’s profit. Then discuss what if retailers decides retail price respectively by Bertrand Game Model, the emulation result demonstrates retailers would accept supply chain’s best price utimately.The last chapter sum up content discussed before, and illuminate this paper’s insufficiencies and innovations.
|
Related Dissertations
- Research on the Problem of Supply Chain Coordination with Contract,F274
- Farm -based options for the next agricultural supply chain coordination,F323.7;F224
- Based on revenue sharing contract VMI Supply Chain Coordination,F274
- Supply Chain Coordination with Contract to Reduce Lost Under Disruption Risk,F224
- Supply Chain Coordination Research with Asymmetric Demand Information and Risk-aversion Participants Based on Option Contract,F830.9;F224
- Three-level Supply Chain Coordination of Fresh and Live Agricultural Products by Revenue-sharing Contracts,F224
- The Three-tier Supply Chain Coordination and Management under Disruption,F224
- Coordination Mechanism and Performance Measurement of Supply Chain for Complex Product Manufacturers,F224
- Research on Supply Chain Coordination Under Asymmetric Demand Information and the Supplier with Finite Capacity,F274
- Research on Quantity Flexibility Contract Model in Financial-constrained Supply Chain,F224
- Analysis of the Value and Risk of an Option Contact in the Supply Chain,F274
- Research on the Investment Control of the Whole Process Agent Construction from the Viewpoints of Government Client,F284
- The Prevention and Controlling of the Final Payment Dispute in the DBB Model on the Owner’s Perspective,F284
- Research on Coordination Policy in Reverse Logistics Management,F252
- Listed Companies’ Top Managers’ Nonlinear Payments Incentive Research: Based on the Risk Match Between Shareholder and Top Manager,F276.6
- The interests of the manufacturers and suppliers of the target cost constraints coordination question,F424;F224
- Research on Manufacturer’s Optimal Capacity Construction under Asymmetric Information,F274
- Delay in Payment with Credit Level of Sellers,F274
- Supply Chain Collaboration Based on Information Sharing: A Comparative Study,F224
- Garlic abnormal price fluctuations based on the perspective of the supply chain to explore the causes and countermeasures,F323.7
- Pricing and Coordination of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Two Markets,F274
CLC: > Economic > Economic planning and management > Economic calculation, economic and mathematical methods > Economic and mathematical methods
© 2012 www.DissertationTopic.Net Mobile
|