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In the financial management of listed companies, investment companies financial decisions starting point is the company's activities for funds to be configured. Efficient investment behavior can maximize the value of the company, and thus make the company competitive in the market to achieve sustainable development. In China, the majority of listed companies from the former state-owned enterprises, by the former state-owned enterprises to take advantage of financial and bank funds \Currently, the state-controlled listed companies is the main force of China's economic development. Therefore, the study of state-owned holding listed companies over-investment behavior has important practical significance. In this paper, qualitative, quantitative and comparative study of combining the three methods, based on the Chinese special institutional background and market environment, from over-investment theory basis, and for investment in state-controlled listed companies over the status quo, increased cash dividend proposed , increasing managerial ownership, strengthen information disclosure, increased financial analyst to follow up, reduce government intervention to strengthen the legal system, environment and other factors, to the state-owned holding listed companies over-investment behavior play a certain role in mitigation. Then, the paper overinvestment conduct an empirical study. Based on the previous results and theoretical overview, based on the 2007-2009 state holding in listed companies as the research object, the state-owned holding listed companies for the existence of over-investment, the central and local enterprises directly under the existence of excessive investment holding company whose existence over-investment behavior is affecting performance of the company, whether to alleviate factors play a role in over-investment behavior conducted descriptive statistical analysis, correlation analysis, independent samples T test and regression analysis. Finally, the presence of state-owned holding listed companies over-investment behavior, this paper proposes restricting recommendations. The main results are the following aspects: (1) the state-owned holding listed companies widespread over-investment and holding companies where there is more serious than the central government over corporate investment behavior; (2) the presence of state-owned holding listed companies over-investment behavior, leading to decreased performance of enterprises; (3) Cash dividends, information disclosure, financial analysts to follow up on the state-controlled investment behavior of listed companies over a certain role in the constraints, but constraints are weak; (4) in the state-owned holding listed companies lower proportion of managerial ownership, leading to over-investment impact without success, is still worthy of attention; (5) to reduce government intervention and strengthening the legal regime against excessive investment environment issues play a role in mitigation .
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