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Trans-boundary water pollution is not only the common problem in the world, but also the realistic trouble needed to be urgently solved in our country. This thesis will not only take on active meanings for governing for Taihu Lake and other trans-boundary valley, but also provide supplement for the theoretical research of trans-boundary pollution.The study focuses on the Taihu Lake trans-boundary water pollution. First, the paper analyses the reasons, and then puts forward three governing modes and contrasts them. Second, the paper builds a suitable mode for governance of Taihu Lake according to the reality of Taihu Lake. At last, the paper provides meanings for the governance of Taihu Lake through the analysis of positive and negative cases. Through the analysis, the thesis obtains main conclusions as follows. Firstly, the main reasons for Taihu Lake trans-boundary water pollution are physics attribute of water, externality, common tragedy, the tragedy of anti-commons and inconsequential structure of industry. Secondly, there are three main trans-boundary water pollution governing modes: state owned mode, privatization mode and self-organized mode. Each mode is different in the motivation, complete information, transaction cost, performance cost and supervision. Due to difference, each mode applies for distinct conditions. Thirdly, it is appropriate to select the composite mode in which the local government cooperation mode is dominant, and the cooperation between local governments is in the foundation of reputation. Fourthly, we can learn much from governing for The Thames and Huaihe River, especially in capital usage, management for valley, local government cooperation and social participatory.There are some innovations. Firstly, the paper concludes five elements that affect the modes and contrasts modes to gain the advantages and disadvantages about every mode from the five aspects. Secondly, this paper constructs the model for Taihu Lake which refers reputation as means to stimulate cooperation between local governments. Thirdly, when it analyses the fiscal decentralization how to lead trans-boundary water pollution, the paper establishes game model between government and enterprise. This model explains that government combines with enterprise in the interest of itself and loosens the supervision.
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