Dissertation > Excellent graduate degree dissertation topics show

Cost Revelation Mechanism of Equipment Acquisition

Author: MengBinBin
Tutor: ZhouJianShe
School: National University of Defense Science and Technology
Course: National Defense Economy
Keywords: equipment acquisition cost distortion revelation mechanism contracts menu principal agent theory
CLC: F426.72
Type: Master's thesis
Year: 2011
Downloads: 57
Quote: 0
Read: Download Dissertation

Abstract


Weapon programs are criticized for cost overruns. Information revelation as a new perspective for this issue is proposed. The distortion of the cost information concludes two parts: distortion resulted by low powered incentives and distortion resulted by cost padding. Details of the cost distortion phenomenon are described based on interviews with related scholars. Further, the reasons are divided into different kinds according to incentives and restrictions. Possible factors that would induce distortion of cost information in every phase of the lifecycle period are listed. Discussions are put forward from equipment market, procurement contracts, arm firms and cost auditing. There are four factors no pressures for quitting, collusions in the biding phase, the strategically buy-in, the capture of arms industry regulation in the limited competition market which lead distortion of cost information. The cost-plus contracts give firms incentives of cost padding and low powered effort for reducing the cost. The audit of cost can not be put into effect because of the rent-seeking and the behavior of maximizing budget. The time and phase of monitor and control for cost information can not meet the cost rule of life cycle period. The imperfection of audit system induces the buyer part not to check out the cost padding. The asymmetry of revenue induces the asymmetry of incentive for cost bargaining.Further, a mathematical structure that models institutions through which equipment acquisition activity is guided and coordinated is presented based on the theory of designing economic mechanisms. We use this cost revelation model to discuss what institutions should be created in order to achieve desired goals the revelation of the real cost. The method involves the construction of the relation between the cost type of arm firms and the type of the contracts. The model suggests the general idea that the acquisition side should structure bargaining by providing a series of linear contracts menu so that firms claiming to be lower cost select themselves into contracts where they bear a higher share of risk. According to the contract menu result of the revelation model and the reasons talked former, all-period control based on target-cost, monitoring of arm firms, advance for competition of arms market are put forward as the equipment cost revelation mechanism.

Related Dissertations

  1. Sensing Data Flasification Attack Defense for Cooperative Spectrum Sensing Schemes in Cognitive Radio Systems,TN925
  2. Research on Requirement Control of Chinese Weapon Systems Acquisition,E237
  3. Analysis and Assessment of Military Weapons and Equipment Acquisition,F253.2;F426.48
  4. Research on Design Competitions of R&D in Equipment Procurement,E91
  5. Military equipment procurement incentive quality regulation Research,E237
  6. Research on Collusion and Collusion-proof Mechanism during Equipment Acquisition,F407.4
  7. A Study on the Pricing Model in Equipment Acquisition,E257
  8. Weapons and equipment procurement market , rent-seeking behavior and Countermeasures,E233
  9. Research on the Incentive Mechanism of State-owned Commercial Banks Based on Principal-Agent Framework,F224
  10. The Growing Family Firms manager choose research,F272
  11. Path Selection of honest government building,D630
  12. Executives of state-owned enterprises pay Influencing Factors,F272
  13. Based on the agency 's public tourism resources development and protection of Incentive Mechanism,F592
  14. Based on a diversified capital structure urban rail transit subsidy mechanism and model,F224
  15. Case Study on Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Acquisitions,F275
  16. On the Incentive Mechanism of the Regulation Subjects in Chinese Real Estate Market,F293.3
  17. Research of Military Products Pricing Method in Equipment Acquisition,F426.48
  18. Corporate Governance demand for audit quality impact study,F239.4;F224
  19. Principal-agent View about Failure of Local Government Public Crisis Warning,D630
  20. Research on Chinese Administrative Accountability System in the Perspective of Principal-agent Theory,D630
  21. Study of the High-tech Enterprises Governance and Business Performance Evaluation Index and Selection Based on the Multi-level Principal-agency Theory,F276.44

CLC: > Economic > Industrial economy > China Industrial Economy > Industrial sector economy
© 2012 www.DissertationTopic.Net  Mobile