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Based on the Legal Protection of the moral hazard of deposit insurance

Author: ZouYingJie
Tutor: LiuShaoJun
School: China University of Political Science
Course: Legal
Keywords: Deposit Insurance Legal System Moral hazard Law to prevent
CLC: D922.281
Type: Master's thesis
Year: 2009
Downloads: 182
Quote: 1
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Abstract


The banking system is inherently unstable, so many countries have established deposit insurance legal system. Deposit insurance and the legal system helps to protect the interests of the majority of small depositors and maintaining financial system stability, and promote the sound development of the banking sector. The success of China's traditional four joint-stock reform of state-owned banks, and the drawbacks of the existing implicit deposit insurance, which is why our country is imperative to establish a legal system of explicit deposit insurance. But the system of deposit insurance law are likely to cause the shortcomings of the moral hazard, moral hazard is caused due to information asymmetry, moral hazard of deposit insurance legal system performance in the weakening of the depositors of the bank's market constraints, banks engaging in risky business behavior regulatory agencies regulatory intolerance. Deposit insurance moral hazard impact of the financial system resulted in an adverse impact, and affect the efficiency of resource allocation. Typical example of the savings and loan crisis in the United States in the 1980s is the deposit insurance moral hazard. But deposit insurance moral hazard is not beyond the control of, but through well-designed legal system to prevent, Preventing Moral Hazard in many countries and regions have a successful experience is worth our reference. The United States as the legal system of deposit insurance in the world run one of the more successful countries, the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s reforms, including to determine the appropriate insurance coverage, gives the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to take prompt corrective action authority to establish risk-based difference in rates, given the extensive powers of the Deposit Insurance Corporation to strengthen financial regulation, these measures have provided a successful experience for the Establishment of Deposit Insurance System. One hand, China should be well-designed deposit insurance legal system to control the moral hazard of deposit insurance, including a quota insurance system, to determine the appropriate scope of insured deposits, the implementation of duties based on the risk differences in rates, explicit deposit insurance agencies and forms of organization, to strengthen the external supervision and deposit insurance agencies. The other hand, should strengthen the supervision of the bank regulatory agencies, and improve the system of lender of last resort, given the appropriate monitoring and supervision rights of the Deposit Insurance Corporation, the three combine to form a sound financial safety net to control the bank's risk management, reduce the risk of moral hazard, maintenance the safety of the financial system.

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CLC: > Political, legal > Legal > Chinese law > Financial Law > Banking Law
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