Dissertation > Excellent graduate degree dissertation topics show

Game Analysis of Patent-protection and Subisidy’s Influence on Enterprise’s R&D

Author: GuoShunLan
Tutor: FangQiYun
School: Huazhong University of Science and Technology
Course: Western Economics
Keywords: R \u0026 D Patent protection Prior subsidies Afterwards subsidies
CLC: F273.1;F204
Type: Master's thesis
Year: 2007
Downloads: 191
Quote: 1
Read: Download Dissertation

Abstract

When a corporate R \u0026 D investments also benefited from other enterprises, R \u0026 D overflow occurs. R \u0026 D spillovers brought one of the most important issues is the external problem: If the overflow is large enough, the free-rider problem occurs a company based on R \u0026 D investments in other companies. But for every company in terms of free-riding are rational, the total R \u0026 D investment is inefficient, but also make the R \u0026 D reduced the enthusiasm. Corporate R \u0026 D results to enable enterprises to obtain a monopoly in a certain period of time to reap excessive profits. Government R \u0026 D should give up the role of the night watchman, set certain mechanism to balance the R \u0026 D externalities and monopoly profits. In this paper, the two incentives of the patent term of protection and subsidies, for example, to discuss balancing mechanism of the government. This article assumes that R \u0026 D overflow exogenous discuss incentive behavior of both government monopoly through the three-stage duopoly game model. Discuss the government granted a patent behavior model, the first stage, the government established the period of patent protection to maximize social welfare; second stage, considering the two companies formed an oligopoly industry, given years of patent protection, R \u0026 D investments to maximize long-term profits; the third phase, the two companies to determine the yield of each phase to maximize profits. The same time, according to the two corporate R \u0026 D and production cooperation, divided into completely uncooperative (R \u0026 D, production is not cooperation), incomplete cooperation (R \u0026 D cooperation, the production of non-cooperation), as well as full cooperation in three forms (R \u0026 D and production cooperation) optimal solution obtained by use inverted push game and concluded: the manufacturers to cooperate in the product market and R \u0026 D stage, there will be a higher level of R \u0026 D than the case of incomplete cooperation and completely uncooperative, manufacturers also will obtain higher profits, but social welfare is not than do not fully cooperative case large. In the discussion of government subsidies, according to the different subsidies occurred prior subsidies and afterwards subsidies two. Advance subsidy model, the decision-making of government subsidies in the first stage, the corporate R \u0026 D investment made in the second stage; enterprise R \u0026 D decisions made in the first stage after the subsidy model, made in the second stage after government subsidies decision-making . Optimal R \u0026 D investment by comparing the two models, concluded: Cournot duopoly competition case, the Government wants to take after the subsidy policy, the subsidy rate is greater than the optimal subsidy rate of advance subsidy model.

Related Dissertations

CLC: > Economic > Economic planning and management > Management of National Economy > Science and Technology Management
© 2012 www.DissertationTopic.Net Mobile