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A Research on the Relationship between Ownership Structure and Minority Investor Protection of Private Listed Companies in China
Author: GaoZuo
Tutor: MaYongQiang
School: Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
Course: Accounting
Keywords: Private Listed Companies Ownership structure Protection of small investors
CLC: F832.51;F224
Type: Master's thesis
Year: 2010
Downloads: 258
Quote: 0
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Abstract
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China is currently in a special period of economic restructuring, with the rapid development of the private economy, private listed companies has become a new force in China's capital market, has an important impact on the development of the national economy. However, in our current system context, the protection of the interests of minority shareholders mechanism is not perfect, major shareholders often through various \is a very typical means, which have become obstacles restricting the healthy and stable development of China's capital market. Compared with the state-owned nature of listed companies and private listed companies ubiquitous pyramid control structure, resulting in private listed companies the expropriation of minority shareholders behavior prone, and the interests of minority shareholders have not been protected. Pyramid control structure, the private listed companies ultimately controlled more motivation to plunder the other small and medium-sized investors, thus seriously compromising the efficiency of the company's private listed companies showed more severe agency problems. Chinese Private Listed Companies efficiency study as a starting point argument violated the interests of small and medium investors in China, to explore the main line to strengthen and improve the interests of minority shareholders protection mechanism to expand the related theoretical analysis and empirical analysis around the main line 's. In this paper, an analysis of the empirical and normative study the behavior of large shareholder expropriation of private listed companies the interests of small investors, trying to reveal violations of the largest shareholder behind deep-seated reasons from listed Equity efficiency perspective, mechanism for the protection of the interests of investors explore from the macro-national institutional level and micro levels of governance, and start from the perspective of microscopic levels of governance research, thereby affecting the transmission mechanism of investor protection on the basis of analysis of the ownership structure as corporate governance. The paper first reviews the relevant literature at home and abroad, the underlying theory analysis and proposed shareholding structure of small and medium-sized investors empirical correlation assumptions, empirical design and empirical testing, and then based on these assumptions and analysis of the empirical results, concluded. The text of this paper section includes the following five chapters. The first chapter is an introduction part. The proposed research problem, explain the background and significance of the research questions; introduced research ideas and methods; Description Writing framework, and summarizes the innovation of this paper, and finally define some of the concepts involved. The second chapter is a theoretical analysis and review of the literature. Begin by reviewing the meaning of the shareholding structure and shareholding structure theory to analyze the different shareholding structure of agency conflicts, then review and discuss the theory of investor protection level from the national system and corporate governance level, based on analysis of the shareholding structure on investor protection. The third chapter is the shareholding structure of the private listed companies investor protection theory analysis, from the second chapter of the general research to specific analysis, analysis of the shareholding structure of private listed companies is how to influence the protection of the interests of the small and medium investors. Chapter empirical research and results analysis. First proposed in the literature review and theoretical analysis on the basis of the research hypotheses, the sampling and data and samples to do a brief description; determine the variables of the study; then introduces the methods of empirical research and the establishment of empirical studies of model , and then come to the results of the empirical analysis of private listed company ownership structure and investor protection issues and clarifications. Particular, this chapter is divided into three parts of descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression analysis. Conducting empirical research, the choice of the ultimate controller of the type of people the nature of listed companies as samples. From two perspectives, namely encroachment from the major shareholders of listed companies and the interests of minority shareholders degree angle, to the largest shareholder of the funds used as a direct measure of the protection of small investors; economic occupation of the listed company and the interests of minority shareholders from the major shareholders consequences angle, as an indirect measure of protection of small investors to private corporate performance of listed companies and private listed companies shareholding structure of the protection of the interests of minority shareholders. As follows: First, a comprehensive understanding of the private equity structure of listed companies with investor protection to examine private listed companies in the two aspects of the ownership structure, investor protection, by descriptive statistical analysis; second step, Private Listed Companies Ownership Structure and Investor Protection correlation analysis, inspection of private equity structure of listed companies and investor protection whether the correlation, in which what relevance; the third step, the selected sample, respectively deviate from the degree of ownership the ownership concentration, Shareholdres, the proportion of the outstanding shares and ultimate control control of four aspects of the protection of small investors a multiple linear regression analysis to test whether private listed company equity structure affect the small and medium investors protection, how it affects the protection of small investors. The fifth chapter is the conclusions of this study and policy recommendations, as well as the inadequacies of this study. This paper's main conclusions of the study: a conflict of interest between the private listed companies controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, is rooted in the controlling shareholder to control the right to infringe on the interests of small investors, the principal-agent problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Good institutional environment and effective corporate governance structures are able to increase the cost of the interests of the controlling shareholder implementation encroachment behavior, motivation and ability to weaken its occupation, the interests of small investors. Controlling shareholder may cause a conflict of interest between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders control over private benefits, so that the decline in the performance of the company. The higher the degree of concentration of ownership of private listed companies, and the stronger the protection of the interests of small investors, large shareholders funds encroachment, the less the better the performance of the company; degree of private listed companies outside blockholders the better protection of the interests of small investors is the stronger the largest shareholder funds encroachment, the less the better the performance of the company; higher proportion of the outstanding shares of private listed companies, the weaker the protection of the interests of the small and medium investors, that the company's shareholders' funds to encroach more and the worse the performance of the company; control over ultimate control to deviate from the greater degree of cash flow right, the weaker the protection of the interests of small investors, the company's largest shareholder funds encroach more and the worse the performance of the company. Main policy recommendations: According to our private equity structure of listed companies on investor protection, the relevant policy recommendations proposed shareholding structure optimization of China's private listed companies and improve investor protection. The shareholding structure of the incentive effects of strengthening private listed companies, to improve the efficiency of corporate governance. Narrow the controlling shareholder of the right to control their cash flow rights gap, to avoid from the original \Cultivate institutional investors added to the governance of the company to develop a diversified strategic investors. Efforts to promote China's private listed company has gradually formed the major shareholders, management, institutional investors and strategic investors, mutual supervision checks and balances of the equity situation. The second is to strengthen awareness of the rights of the minority shareholders and supervision effect. Circulation, continue to adhere to actively create conditions to achieve equity to consolidate the stock market. The regulatory authorities must promote and create the conditions for small and medium-sized investors to actively participate in the rights. Enhance the awareness of the rights of the minority shareholders, to learn how to defend their legitimate rights and interests. The third is to strengthen the efficiency of the supervision of the securities regulatory authorities, improve the regulatory approach of the Private Listed Companies. Increase the the punishment listed companies irregularities gradually formed by the SFC, exchanges, industry associations constitute, the functional complementation regulatory system. To strengthen the on-site verification of large shareholders acting in more serious degree of cash flow rights to control the right to deviate from the private listed companies to strengthen supervision. Fourth, to further standardize information disclosure of private listed companies. Controlling shareholder disclosure, it should be traced back to the final control, private listed companies and require timely disclosure of the relationship of associated shareholders, in particular, to make a detailed disclosure of the associated companies following the same ultimate control to avoid concealing the true ultimate all through a multi-storey complex relationship controlling person. The fifth is to strengthen the company's internal legislation. Weak legal protection of investors macro governance environment, by the internal laws, such as the Articles of Association of the Company, to improve corporate governance, standardize the rules for the operation of general meeting of shareholders, board of directors, board of supervisors really play their due role to avoid large The shareholders of the phenomenon of prejudice to the interests of small shareholders. Inadequacies of research: (1) did not address other types of enterprises, lack of comparative studies, feasibility studies and not comprehensive. (2) the interests of minority shareholders are often subject to internal controlling shareholders, managers double infringement of minority shareholders and controlling shareholders, managers proxy conflict often can not be separated. The only agency conflicts of minority shareholders and the controlling shareholder, the without involving managers proxy issue. (3) The index selection is not comprehensive. The ownership structure is just the level of corporate governance, which is a very important factor. The article only on the degree of concentration of ownership, equity checks and balances, the proportion of outstanding shares, the ultimate control the people control rights and cash flow right relationship between the degree of investor protection, and did not examine the nature of the equity investor protection.
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CLC: > Economic > Economic planning and management > Economic calculation, economic and mathematical methods > Economic and mathematical methods
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