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In the knowledge economy and global integration in the context of patent Alliance is to promote the formation of industry technical standards, promoting technological development has played a pivotal role, is also increasingly multinational patent alliance therefore favored and became its function as a knowledge advantage monopoly licensing market, technical barriers to build a powerful tool. After years of development, the organizational form of patent pools and operating mechanisms are changing the current patent alliance is no longer just a simple patent licensing agencies, but also in areas related products play a leadership position. Meanwhile, there is a lot of vertical integration is becoming a member of the current coalition patent alliance subject, this change profoundly change the appearance of patent licensing and innovation in the league two aspects of performance, this very necessary theoretical and empirical perspective conduct in-depth research on these issues, which the Chinese government and enterprises, increase understanding of patent pools, master league operation rules, thus effectively regulate transnational patent alliance, formed mainly by Chinese enterprises patent alliance, and through effective organization and operation to achieve licensing revenues and the continued increase in the output of innovation have important theoretical and achieve significance. This article aims to introduce the vertical structure of the patent alliance theoretical studies, the presence of vertical integration of members of the patent alliance effect problem, through the review of existing studies identify the shortcomings of current research, and in the definition of the concept of the patent alliance on the basis of the two studies. First, the vertical structure is introduced into the Union license price game in the past, and by building a theoretical model to solve industry licensing structure under different license price equilibrium, industry output and product prices, to achieve the effect of licensing issues related to research. Secondly, the Union established by analyzing the expected licensing income distribution, licensing restrictions and other factors independent of study, research alliance to establish innovation output before and after the changes, and by comparing the different conditions Alliance members and external business innovation incentive problems, research patents Union innovation effect problem. Through analysis, the main conclusions of this paper include: (1) patent alliance can internalize externalities can effectively avoid the patent world \business out of professional producers, while the production sectors affected by the license price is less than professional developers, and when there is patent alliance, there is no crowding out, and the equilibrium conditions, permit lower prices, lower product prices, industry production more large. (3) In case of difference between the value of patents, coalition building is expected to significantly enhance the industry innovation output level, and contrast, for enterprises that wish to join the Union greater impact. When the alliance is established, the company's innovation incentive income distribution will be subject to licensing and independent licensing conditions, but also has a number of patents related with the Union. (4) the presence of different types of innovation differences between members, and their investment in innovation between complementary relationship.
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